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This paper discusses the influence of recent health care reform acts in Germany on choice, 
guidance and access from the perspective of patients, insured, insurers, and health care 
providers. Particular emphasis is put on health policy reforms since 2004, i.e. the Social Health 
Insurance Modernization Act 2004 and the most recent Social Health Insurance Competition 
Strengthening Act 2007. Various aspects of the reforms are included as long as they have an 




Dieser Beitrag diskutiert den Einfluss vergangener gesundheitspolitischer Reformgesetze in 
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Patienten, Versicherten, Versicherungen und Leistungsanbietern. Dabei werden insbesondere 
das Gesetz zur Modernisierung der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung 2004 (GMG) sowie das 
Gesetz zur Stärkung des Wettbewerbs in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung 2007 (GKV-
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1.  Introduction 
This paper discusses the influence of recent health care reform acts on access, choice and 
guidance in German health care. Traditionally, Germans enjoy a very high degree of free 
access and choice of both providers and health care insurance. Health care services are 
available, reachable and affordable. Instead of underuse, the German system rather suffers 
from overuse of health care services. Therefore policy makers have recently introduced 
measures that are to restrict utilization of services and provide stronger guidance for patients. 
The Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) Modernization Act (GMG) of 2004 and the Statutory 
Health Insurance Competition Strengthening Act (GKV-WSG) of 2007 constitute turning points 
in this regard. For the first time in the history of German health care, the GMG introduced user 
fees for outpatient health services. Both acts promote new forms of care that are to improve 
care coordination and patient guidance but also to increase competition among health care 
providers. This paper will take a closer look at these measures and accompanying changes at 
the institutional and organisational level and describe their impact on access to and utilization 
of health services as far as research results are available. Other aspects of the reforms are 
included as long as they have an influence on access and choice to health care in Germany. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we shortly discuss concepts of access, choice 
and guidance. In section 3 we describe the status quo of access to and choice of health care in 
Germany prior to 2004. We look at past health care reforms (1988-2003) and their impact on 
access and choice from the perspective of the insured, patients, insurers, and health care 
providers. Section 4 discusses the impact of the SHI Modernization Act 2004 and the SHI 
Competition Strengthening Act
1 on access, choice and guidance. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.   Concepts of access, choice and guidance in health care 
Definitions of access 
The World Health Organization defines access in health care as the proportion of the 
population that reaches appropriate health services (WHO 1998). Other definitions interpret 
access as a basic minimum of benefits that ensures that no citizen falls beneath a particular 
level of subsistence, or see access guaranteed when the same level or quality of health care is 
equally accessible to all, regardless of social status, residence and income (Wörz et al. 2006a). 
Moreover, it can be differentiated between access to care for individuals with different types of 
diseases such as emergency and acute care patients, elective surgery patients and the 
chronically ill.  
 
Whereas internationally, access is discussed in the order of availability (infrastructure, human 
resources), reachability (within easy geographical reach), and affordability (financing, ability-
to-pay, reimbursability of defined benefits) (Wörz et al. 2006a), the debate in Germany 
focusses on the latter. However, from an economic point of view, one has to keep in mind that 
increasing resource allocation to health care involves trade-offs on four different levels: On the 
first level, health care is just one field of public activity among others (such as education, 
defense, public transport, etc.). Secondly, it has to be decided how much resources are spent on 
each of the stages of medical care (e.g. prevention, acute care, rehabilitation, long-term care, 
etc.). Third, within acute care, resources are traded off between diagnoses and treatment. And 
fourth, resources can be allocated according to diseases, for example according to the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). In general, there are few infrastructural or 
 
1 Most aspects of the reform will come into force in April 2007. However certain elements are going to take effect 
at a later date. See section 4 for details.   4 
                                                
geographic barriers to access health care in Germany. The two main barriers to free access and 
choice in the German health care system are cost-sharing arrangements and the introduction of 




Managed Care Organizations are an important subject of study when examining the role of 
choice and guidance in health care. For instance, they are the result of selective contracting 
which requires freedom of contract for providers and insurers. On the other hand, especially 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) limit free choice of providers for individuals by 
requiring all care to be delivered through the plan’s network and only after being authorized by 
the primary care physician. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and Point of Service 
Organizations (POS) include less strict restrictions of choice. They are characterized by a two-
tier coverage and aim to steer patients to network providers via financial incentives or a 
combination of financial incentives and a primary physician acting as a gatekeeper.
3 In the US-
health care system, the “public backlash” (Docteur et al. 2003) caused by consumers and 




In contrast to these developments in the U.S., the U.K. and other countries, German health 
policy makers are promoting forms of care that reduce choice for patients. Lack of 
coordination between outpatient and inpatient care in Germany has caused problems in funding 
and purchasing of health care. Experts argue that reducing choice and guiding patients via 
integrated care (2000, 2004) and disease management programs (2002) could at least partially 
contribute to improving horizontal and vertical coordination and also increase competition 
among providers and sickness funds.  
 
3.  Access, choice and guidance in Germany – Status Quo 
In this chapter we look at past health care reforms up to the year 2004 and their impact on 
access, choice and guidance in German health care. The main objective of reforms prior to 
2004
5 was cost containment in the SHI system. In order to decrease expenditure and increase 
efficiency, these reforms, most notably the Health Care Structure (HCS) Act of 1993, 
introduced competition among sickness funds and shifted part of public expenditures to 
patients (Busse and Riesberg 2004). Cost containment measures with the strongest impact on 
access and choice of health care were the introduction of new and the increase of existing co-
payments, the exclusion of certain services from the SHI benefit catalogue and the opening of 
sickness funds to (almost) all SHI insurees. Prior to 2004, new forms of care like gatekeeping 
programs, integrated care and disease management programs have only played a minor role in 





2 In this context we define patient guidance as counselling and support for patients in determining the most 
suitable care arrangements and methods. Guidance can be given by physicians and/or a physician’s practice team. 
Stronger patient guidance is expected to lead to more effective and efficient care. 
3 For the different types of Managed Care see for example Wagner (1996) and Hauser (1988). 
4 In 2005, 61% of all covered employees in the USA where covered through a PPO-plan, 21% through an HMO-
plan, 15% through a POS-plan and 3% through a traditional indemnity plan (Gabel et al. 2005). 
5 For a detailed list of health care reforms passed from 1988 until today please refer to Annex 1 to this paper.   5 
3.1  The perspective of insured  
Insurance coverage 
So far, Germany and Ireland are the only two European countries that do not have a universal 
health insurance system (to be changed in Germany with the SHI Competition Strengthening 
Act 2007, see section 3.2). However, only 0.2% of the entire population or 200.000 people 
have no health insurance at all, although the number of uninsured has been rising over the last 
years (Laschet 2005).  
 
Introduction of sickness fund choice 
The Health Care Structure Act of 1993 introduced for the first time free choice of sickness 
funds for the majority of their members (approximately 97%, see Wörz and Busse 2005). 
Exempt are miners, sailors and farmers that are insured in closed sickness funds with a 
relatively low number of members. Insurees can choose among 252 different sickness funds 
and can change funds once every 18 months or when contribution rates are increased. Sickness 
funds are to compete for insurees over contribution rates and certain special programs such as 
“no claim” bonus schemes.  
 
Since 1996 about one in four persons has changed their sickness fund at least once (Braun et al. 
2006). Table 1 shows the proportion of insured who changed their SHI fund in a given year. 
Studies show that the main reason for changing is the contribution rate
6. Individuals that 
changed funds are in better health than those who did not change (Wörz and Busse 2005) and 
younger persons are more willing to change than the elderly (Braun et al. 2006). Sickness 
funds that gained in membership were above all company-based funds whose contribution 
rates tend to be lower than those of for example regional sickness funds. Regional funds were 
those that lost most members (ibid). 
 
Table 1 – Proportion of insureds who changed their statutory sickness fund (in %). 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
West 
Germany 
3.8  4.3 4.3 5.5 5.7 4.4 5.0 5.7 
East 
Germany 
4.8  4.8 5.2 6.0 6.2 3.9 5.5 6.6 
Total  4.0  4.4 4.5 5.7 5.8 4.3 5.1 5.9 
Numbers are based on a sample from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP); Source: Andersen, H. and Grabka, M. 
(2006), p. 150. 
 
SHI benefit basket 
Both the coalition of Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party (1982-1998) and the coalition 
of Social Democrats and The Greens (1998-2005) were faced with increasing health 
expenditures and felt pressure to apply stricter cost containment measures. They excluded 
services from the benefit basket and introduced stricter rules for health technology assessment.  
The Social Code Book V, the legal framework for the German SHI system, stipulates that the 
SHI has to provide “[…] medically necessary services according to the principle of 
appropriateness in a sufficient and efficient way.” (Wörz and Busse 2005, p. 134). Measured 
by this definition and given that the benefit basket of the German SHI is quite comprehensive 
covering outpatient and hospital treatment, medication, dental treatment as well as 
rehabilitation services, exclusion of services from the benefit catalogue have so far not caused 
                                                 
6 Contribution rates of sickness funds range from about 12% to 15.5% of gross earned income up to the 
contribution ceiling of €3562,5 (2006). Therefore, individuals can save about 62 Euros per month at the most if 
they change their sickness fund.    6 
any access shortages. Insurees continue to have access to an appropriate number of services at 
a high level of quality. The content of the SHI benefit basket is predetermined up to about 
95%. Reimbursable services are determined jointly by sickness funds and in- and outpatient 
health care providers in the Federal Joint Committee, a decision making body of the joint self-
governing body in the German health system
7. 
 
Next to the benefits that are reimbursed by sickness funds, insurees have access to individual 
health care services (so-called IGeL services) that need to be paid for privately. The Federal 
Joint Committee has classified these services as medically not necessary and therefore they are 
not included in the SHI benefit basket. 
 
Since the emphasis in German health care lies on acute care, availability of preventive services 
is still limited. The SHI benefit basket comprises certain preventive measures such as breast 
cancer screening for women older than 30, colon cancer screening for persons older than 50, 
and two dental health check-ups per year. However, outpatient physicians are not incentivized 
to offer continuous preventive services to their patients because remuneration is based on a fee-
for-service system for treating sick patients. For individuals with chronic and complex 
conditions who need ongoing support during non-acute phases of their diseases, adequate care 
is not yet available to the extent necessary (Advisory Council on the Assessment of 
Developments in the Health Care System 2005; Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in 
Health Care 2001).  
 
3.2.  The perspective of patients 
Availability and infrastructure 
Although there is only few data on waiting times in Germany, recent patient surveys indicate 
differences in waiting times based on type of insurance (see table 2), age and place of 
residency (Zok 2007; KBV/FGW 2006; Wörz et al. 2006b; Ulmann et al. 2005). SHI insurees, 
older patients, and patients living in less-populated, rural areas tend to wait longer for 
physician appointments. All in all, privately insured seem to be privileged in access to office-
based physicians. 
 
Table 2: Waiting times for outpatient physician visits 
   SHI insurees  Privately insured 
Not at all  23.4 31.6 
1 day  8.5 13.5 
2-7 days  27.7 34.1 
8-14 days  15.0 13.0 
2-4 weeks  11.7 4.9 
more than 4 weeks  13.6 2.9 
Source: Zok 2007. 
 
With regard to the ratio of health professionals to the population, Germany lies above the 
OECD average: In 2002 there were 3.4 practising physicians per 1000 inhabitants in Germany, 
the OECD average is 3 physicians per 1000 inhabitants (OECD Health Data 2006). However, 
demographic developments (aging population, migration toward urban centers, increasing 
                                                 
7 For more information on how the benefit basket in Germany is determined refer to Busse et al. 2005a and 
Schreyögg et al. 2005.    7 
number of physicians about to reach retirement age) are expected to lead to a shortage of health 
professionals in some rural regions in (East) Germany within the next five years (Federal 
Association of SHI Physicians 2003; see also Wörz et al. 2006b). Between December 2005 and 
December 2006 alone, the number of general practitioners in the Eastern states decreased by 
3.1% (Federal Association of SHI Physicians 2007). These developments may deteriorate 
access to health care, especially for the older population with restricted mobility. Some Eastern 
federal states try to offset the impact of the looming shortfall of physicians. One strategy is the 
employment of community nurses who visit patients in their homes and carry out tasks that 
normally would have to be performed in physician practices (see Blum 2006). 
 
Affordability of health care 
Reforms during the last 20 years have steadily increased both the level of co-payments and the 
number of drugs and health care services on which co-payments were imposed. This trend can 
be observed for dental care, medical devices and aids, emergency transportation as well as for 
in- and outpatient services. The share of private expenditure in total health care expenditure has 
consequently grown during the last years: from 19.5% in 1995 to 21.8% in 2003 (see table 3).  
 
Table 3: Expenditure on health by sources of funds as % of total expenditure on health 




19.5  20.9  21.5  21.6  21.8 
Out-of-pocket 
payments 
10.0  10.8  10.9  10.7  10.4 
Private health 
insurance 
7.6  7.9  8.2  8.3  8.8 




1.9  2.1  2.4  2.5  2.6 
Public expenditure 
on health 






14.3  10.8  10.1  10.2  9.8 
Social security 
schemes  
66.2  68.3  68.4  68.2  68.4 
Sources: OECD HEALTH DATA 2006  
 
In order to ensure equal access to care based on need, financial hardship regulations and 
exemptions for certain groups of insured based on age, income, and health status were 
introduced. Children up to the age of 18 were exempt from co-payments. For low-income 
individuals and the chronically ill yearly limits for co-payments exist (2% and 1% of gross 
annual household income, respectively).  
 
Research on the impact of co-payments and user charges on access or utilization of health care 
in Germany is scarce. In general, co-payments and user charges tend to be regressive and can 
constitute a heavy burden on low-income earners (see e.g. De Graeve and Van Ourti 2003; 
                                                 
8 This includes health expenditure incurred by corporations and private employers providing occupational health 
services and other unfunded medical benefits to employees plus expenditure by non-profit institutions serving 
households such as the Red Cross, etc.; benefits provided for free by medical care providers plus health 
expenditure incurred by the rest of the world (OECD 2006). Murray et al. n.d.). Preliminary results from a study among insurees of Germany’s biggest 
regional sickness fund indicate that co-payments might have a negative impact on utilization of 
health care because patients are not familiar with the rules for exemption and therefore do not 
make use of them
9 (Eller et al. 2002).  
 
Altogether there seem to be no marked differences in utilization of health care services based 
on income though. Studies showed that low-income earners make higher use of health care 
services than high-income earners (Winkelhage et al. 1992, in Wörz and Busse 2005). A study 
by van Doorslaer et al. (2004) indicates that there is a pro-poor inequity with regard to general 
practitioner visits and a slight pro-rich inequity for specialist visits. 
 
3.3.  The perspective of insurers 
Statutory Health Insurance 
The Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) System in Germany is ruled by public law (the Social 
Code Book V), comprises some 252 fiscally autonomous and self-sufficient sickness funds 
(January 2007), and insures about 85.5% of the German population.
10 As figure 1 shows, the 
total number of sickness funds has been steadily decreasing, especially since the regional and 
substitute funds were legally opened to everyone in the SHI system through the Health Care 
Structure Act in 1993. There are seven different types of sickness funds in the SHI-system: 
Regional funds (AOK), company-based sickness funds (BKK), guild funds (IKK), substitute 
funds, agricultural funds (LKK), the maritime health insurance fund, and the Federal Miner’s 
Insurance Institution (Bundesknappschaft).  
 









1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Regional funds Company-based funds Guild funds Agricultural Funds Substitute Funds
 
Source: German Ministry of Health (2005); Not in graph: Maritime health insurance fund and Federal Miner’s 
Insurance Institution. 
 
                                                 
9 In Germany, it is the patients’ responsibility to prove that private expenses for health care exceed the yearly co-
payment limit.  
  8 
10 Sources: German Ministry of Health, Federal Statistical Office.    9 
                                                
The SHI system is based on the pay-as-you-go-system and is organized as a compulsory 
insurance for those earning less than € 3,975.00 a month and for unemployed, pensioners, 
students, disabled persons, poor and homeless people. Individuals with an income above the 
income threshold for compulsory insurance or those who are self-employed can either stay in 
the social system on a voluntary basis or opt out and purchase private health insurance. On the 
other hand, sickness funds are obliged to contract. Dependents (children and non-employed 
spouses) are co-insured without extra costs. Statutory sickness funds are financed through 
social security contributions related to ability to pay. In January 2006, the average contribution 
rate of all sickness funds was 13.25% of earned income or its replacements (e.g. pensions or 
unemployment benefits). Generally, contributions are equally shared among employers and 
employees, (thus each of them paying 6.625%), however, since July 2005, employees have to 
pay a special contribution of 0.9% covering expenditures for dentures. Due to the way 
financing is organized, a number of redistributive effects occur: Expenditures are redistributed 
from healthy to sick individuals, from young to old individuals, from singles to families, from 
individuals with high income to individuals with low income (as long as the high income 
individuals earn less than the contribution ceiling of €3,562.50 a month) and from men to 
women. A refund of contributions in case an individual did not make use of health care 
services throughout a year is only possible for voluntarily insured individuals and is limited to 
a monthly contribution. 
 
Independent of the amount of contributions paid or the duration of the insurance, every insured 
(members of a particular sickness fund and their dependants) are entitled to the same benefits 
(provision of and access to care). Except of sick and maternity benefits, benefits are generally 
granted through the principle of benefits in kind meaning health providers are reimbursed 
directly from sickness funds without the patient having to pay for services first. 
 
Private Health Insurance  
In contrast to the SHI system, private health insurances are based on a private contract between 
the insured and the insurance company and build upon the funded principle in order to 
guarantee lower premiums at a higher age. Currently, about 10.2% of the population are 
inscribed to one of the 52 private health insurance companies.
11 Until the present reform, old-
age provisions were tied to a specific insurance company thus the longer an individual stayed 
in a particular insurance company, the more unattractive it became to switch to another 

















11 Sources: Federal Statistical Office, Association of private health insurers.   10  
Table 4 – Old-age provisions of private health insurers in Germany. 
 Year   in Billion €   %- Change  
1992 19,21     
1993 21,66  11.3 
1994 24,60  12.0 
1995 28,38  13.3 
1996 33,28  14.7 
1997 38,69  14.0 
1998 44,62  13.3 
1999 52,14  14.4 
2000 59,55  12.4 
2001 68,22  12.7 
2002 76,30  10.6 
2003 85,14  10.4 
2004 93,81  9.2 
2005 103,37  10.2 
Source: Association of private health insurers, Annual reports (provisions include health care and long-term care 
provisions) 
 
Only employees with a monthly income higher than €3,975.00 a month, public servants, and 
self-employed individuals have access to private health insurances. Dependants each have their 
own individual contract with individually risk-rated premiums. Insurance companies can 
choose whether to close a contract or not. Premiums are based on the benefits principle and 
risk-oriented according to the state of health, age, sex, coverage, etc. They are partly paid for 
by the employer (the highest average employer’s contribution in the SHI serves as a 
maximum). Besides the redistribution from healthy to sick individuals, there is no distribution 
based on solidarity grounds. The extent of the benefit package depends on the individual 
contract and benefits are granted according to the cost reimbursement principle. Hence, when 
health services are used, the privately insured individual will pay the provider before being 
reimbursed by his or her insurance company. Finally, refund of contribution is generally part of 
private health insurance contracts. Table 5 summarizes the main differences between the 











   11  
Table 5 - Comparison of SHI  funds and private health insurances in Germany. 
    Statutory Health Insurance System   Private Health Insurances 
Type of Insurance   Compulsory insurance by law (pay-as-
 you-go-system) 
 Private Contract (funded system) 
Insured  •  Compulsory insured 
•  Voluntarily insured 
•  Employees with a monthly income > 
3.975 € 
•  Public Servants, self-employed, etc. 
Obligation to contract   Yes  No 
Financing  •    Social security contributions 
(related to ability to pay) 
•  Employer‘s and employee‘s 
contribution 
•  Risk structure equalisation (RSA) 
•  Risk-oriented premiums (benefits 
principle) (state of health, age, sex, 
coverage, etc) 
•  Partially paid by employer 
Redistribution  •  From healthy to sick individuals 
•  From young to old individuals 
•  From singles to families 
•  From high to low income 
•  From men to women  
•  From healthy to sick individuals 




  Dependents are co-insured without 
extra- costs. 
Dependents have their own individual 
contract with respective premiums. 
Benefits  •  Principle of benefits in kind  (except 
of sick benefit, maternity benefit) 
•  Identical benefit package 
Cost reimbursement principle 
Contribution refund    Only for voluntarily insured 
individuals 
Yes 
Source: Based on Simon 2005, p. 128. 
 
3.4.  The perspective of health care providers 
Generally, there has been a clear sectoral division between outpatient and inpatient care and 
patients can freely choose providers in both sectors.
12  The separation largely results from 
different reimbursement schemes within the two sectors and from the way the negotiating 
process between health care providers and insurances is currently organized.
13  
 
In the outpatient sector, health care services are reimbursed according to a fee-for-service 
system with a fixed budget and floating (point) values. The traditional bargaining process 
within the SHI is based on a system of collective contracting. Outpatient providers such as 
general practitioners and specialists belong to one of the 17 so-called Regional Associations of 
Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (“Kassenärztliche Vereinigung”, KV) that contract with 
the regional head associations of SHI sickness funds. In return for being reimbursed by the 
sickness funds, the association of physicians takes over a service guarantee
14.  
 
In contrast to that, the inpatient sector is characterized by a dualistic hospital funding system 
where operating costs are reimbursed by sickness funds based on the G-DRG system 
introduced in 2004 and by tax-financed state funds covering capital investments. The service 
guarantee is provided by the states. For inpatient care, the individual hospital contracts directly 
with sickness funds. Figure 2 summarizes the negotiating process. 
                                                 
12 The fragmentation also extends to rehabilitation, long-term care and prevention. 
13 As a consequence of fragmentation, there is a parallel structure for specialist care: Specialists can be found 
providing inpatient care in hospitals as employees and outpatient care as office-based, self-employed solo 
practitioners. 
14 According to § 75 of the Social Code Book V, the KV has to guarantee adequate medical services in terms of quality, 
geographical reachability, time, needs, and economic efficiency.   12  
Figure 2 - The Negotiating Process in the German Health Care System 
 
Source: Own graph.  
 
Up to 2004, departures from this standard way of providing care, e.g. through guiding patients 
via managed care were very rare in German health care. On a regional level experimental 
settings prior to integrated care legislation and structural contracts existed that aimed at 
improving coordination and cooperation in health care. However, on a large scale new types of 
service delivery remained unpopular even though integrated care had been introduced with the 
2000 health reform. This can be partly attributed to missing financial incentives, experience 
and expertise. Moreover, many legal, tax and organizational obstacles had to be overcome. A 
major challenge was that until 2004 the Regional Associations of Statutory Health Insurance 
Physicians had to be obligatory partners in integrated care contracts. With more integrated care 
contracts based on selective contracting, KVs would lose influence as their current 
responsibility is to collectively contract with sickness funds (see above p. 13f.). This caused 
conflicts of interest and impeded further development of integrated care (Hesse 2005). Other 
than experimental integrated care settings some sickness funds started offering GP-centered 
schemes to their insured on a voluntary basis. Bonus schemes and the reimbursement of co-
payments work as incentives for the insured to enrol in those plans.  
 
4.  New provisions under the Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act 
2004 (GMG) and the recent reform legislation (Statutory Health 
Insurance – Competition Strengthening Act (GKV-WSG)) 
4.1.  The perspective of insured 
Universal coverage 
The SHI Competition Strengthening Act, to come into force in April 2007, will make universal 
health insurance mandatory. Every resident will be required to take out health insurance either 
through social health insurance or privately. Although the number of uninsured individuals in 
Germany is small compared to countries such as the United States, it has been rising over the 
last years. Both public and private insurers have so far not been obliged to sell insurance. In the 
past they could reject individuals who had no coverage or who had lost their insurance due 
to  unemployment, divorce, or low-income jobs. Under the new provision, individuals who 
have lost coverage are to return to the type of insurance where they had last been covered.  
Private insurers will have to offer at least a basic benefit package. Individuals falling under the 
Market for Health Care 





(Insurees / Patients) 
Negotiations between 
Insurances and Providers  
(collective and individual contracts ) 
Providers  
(office-based physicians, hospitals, 
rehabilitation, medical centers etc.) 
Health Insurers 
(SHI and PHI)   13  
                                                
SHI scheme are required to take out insurance from April 1, 2007, those that fall under the 
private insurance scheme from January 1, 2009, on.  
 
More choice for insured individuals 
Choice for insurees and patients has been widened by encouraging sickness funds to offer 
different tariffs and types of plans such as GP-centered care schemes, deductible health plans, 
integrate care schemes, etc. (see section 3.3). On the other hand, choice will be restricted to a 
certain degree when insurees choose gatekeeping plans or integrated care plans (see section 
3.4). Finally, sickness funds with closed membership will be opened to all insurees in the SHI 
system
15. The only sickness funds that remain closed are some company-based sickness funds 
and farmer sickness funds. 
 
Extension of the benefit basket 
The SHI benefit basket will be extended to include new services, especially in the area of 
prevention and rehabilitation. From April 2007 on, sickness funds will be required to pay for 
rehabilitative care services for the elderly. This is to improve health status of elderly persons 
after accidents or illnesses, assisting them to stay in their own home and to lead an active, self-
determined life. So far, elderly persons would frequently end up in a nursing home after an 
accident or severe illness. The widening of the SHI benefit basket in this area certainly 
improves access to care for the elderly. Moreover, sickness funds are obliged to reimburse 
vaccinations that are recommended by the federal institute responsible for disease control and 
prevention (Robert Koch Institute). Further, treatment for families with children at 
rehabilitative resorts will also be added to the SHI catalogue. Additionally the GKV-WSG will 
improve access to care for the terminally ill by including palliative care into the benefit basket 
of sickness funds. Palliative care teams consisting of medical and nursing professionals will be 
approved and take over care for this part of the population.  
 
New elements in private health insurance: changes in access, basic tariff and portability of 
reserves for old age 
The  GKV-WSG introduces more restrictive rules for taking out private health insurance, 
thereby decreasing choice for part of the population. While so far insurees could opt out of SHI 
once their income exceeded the threshold (3,975 per month in 2006), this threshold now has to 
be exceeded for three years in a row. This prevision is to increase solidarity and financial 
fairness in health insurance: High-income earners can no longer leave social health insurance 
as easily any more and their contributions will remain within the SHI system.  
 
On the other hand, the GKV-WSG also makes access to private health insurance easier and less 
costly for certain groups of the population, e.g. for those that used to be privately insured and 
could not afford the premiums anymore or for insured at an high age with high premiums, 
since private health insurers will be required to offer a basic tariff from January 2009 on. New 
insurees can choose this tariff without risk assessment and without an additional risk premium. 
The basic tariff includes benefits similar to those offered in social health insurance and 
insurances cannot exclude any services. The premium is not to exceed the maximum SHI 
contribution rate (about 260 Euros per month) and can be lowered if the premium surpasses a 
certain percentage of the insured’s income.  
 
Moreover, choice for privately insured individuals is widened by establishing a portability 
provision. Privately insured can now change insurer and carry along part of their reserves for 
old age. This has not been possible so far and constituted a major obstacle to changing private 
 
15 This applies for the maritime health insurance fund and for the Federal Miner’s Insurance Institution.   14  
                                                
insurers. Further, privately insured can switch insurers without renewed risk assessment if they 
choose the basic tariff.  
 
4.2.  The perspective of patients 
As a novelty in the German health care system, the GMG introduced a co-payment for access 
to outpatient care. Patients have to pay 10€ per quarter for the first appointment at a 
physician’s and dentist’s office and for each physician visit without a referral from the first-
visited physician. The aim of this measure is to decrease the utilization of unnecessary out-
patient physician visits and to encourage self-medication of petty diseases (Gebhardt, 2005). 
Germans see their physician more often than their European neighbors: 7.8 times per year 
compared to an average of 6.2 times per year in the EU-15 states (Hesse and Schlette, 2005). 
 
Empirical studies show mixed results with respect to the impact of the 10€ fee on utilization of 
out-patient health care services. Data from the Bertelsmann Stiftung Healthcare Monitor
16 
indicated that the number of physician visits initially declined (by about 8% between spring 
2003 and spring 2005) but seems to remain relatively stable now (Gebhardt, 2005). Augurzky 
et al. (2006) found that the co-payment did not have a significant effect on the probability to 
visit a physician. Grabka et al. (2006) showed a negative impact of the fee on unnecessary 
consultations and did not find any social discrimination.  
 
However, the user fee seems to have caused some unwanted social and health effects. Zok 
showed in a study conducted in 2004 that low-income earners tended to avoid physician visits 
after the introduction of the 10€ practice fee (see also Gebhardt 2005) but could not replicate 
these results in his 2005 study. Patients in bad health were more likely to reduce visits than 
patients in good health (Gebhardt 2005). Physicians brought up concerns that the number of 
medically needed physician visits went down as well (ibid). A study by Koch and Brenner 
(2005) showed that patients made less use of preventive health check-ups and that utilization of 
out-patient services among children and adolescents decreased. Both prevention check-ups and 
physician visits for children are exempt from the user fee though. 
4.3.  The perspective of insurers 
Health Fund in the SHI-system 
The so-called Health Fund is the core of the current reform and constitutes a major change on 
the financing side of the SHI system. It is supposed to start operating from January 1
st 2009. 
The Fund will collect money from three different sources: Contributions from employers and 
employees and public funds. Currently, contribution rates differ quite extensively among 
sickness funds.
17 In the future, social contribution rates will be unified and regulated by law. 
The sickness funds will continue to collect the contributions from employers, however, from 
2011 on, they are allowed to charge regional authorities with the collection. Public funds from 
the federal government have already been an additional source of financing non-insurance 
services in the past: In 2006, €4.2 billion were transferred into the SHI system from the 
increase in the revenue of the tobacco tax. In 2007 and in 2008, this amount has been reduced 
to €1.5 billion per year. According to the new law, the tax pillar of the Health Fund is going to 
 
16 The Bertelsmann Stiftung Healthcare Monitor is a representative survey instrument. Twice a year, 1500 SHI 
insurees and once a year about 500 physicians are being interviewed about issues relevant to healthcare policy. 
For further information on the Healthcare Monitor see www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
0A000F0A-A3AC0FA5/bst_en/hs.xsl/prj_7097_7113.htm.  
17 C.f. footnote 5.   15  
be increased to €3 billion in 2009 and is supposed to be further augmented in the upcoming 
years. It shall be used to an increasing extent for the free co-insurance of children.
18  
 
Table 6 - Federal government funds to the SHI-system, 2004-2009 in billion €. 







Sources: German Federal (Social) Insurance Authority, Federal Ministry of Health; *: estimated values. 
 
The sickness funds are going to receive transferrals from the Health Fund which are made up 
of a lump sum payment and a risk adjusted payment. The risk adjusted payment will reflect 
age, sex, and a list of 50-80 diseases causing average per head health expenditures to be at least 
50% above average SHI expenditures. Thus, this new system tries to take into consideration 
clinical characteristics and progression of diseases. The existing risk equalisation scheme came 
into place in 1994 with the aim of avoiding risk-selection. It equalises the financial 
consequences of factors such as age, sex, number of non-contributing dependents, number of 
insured pensioners with reduced earning capacity, type of sick benefits rights, and the different 
incomes of the members subject to contributions. In 2002, the risk equalisation scheme was 
supplemented by two additional factors: First, the registration of chronically ill in structured 
disease management programs (DMP) as an additional morbidity characteristic and second, a 
risk pool partially compensates for expensive benefit cases.
19  
 
If a particular sickness fund cannot cover its expenditures with the transferrals received by the 
Health Fund, it can charge an additional premium from its insured. This premium can be 
nominal or income-related and sickness funds can either collect them autonomously or charge 
the Health Fund to do so. On the other hand, sickness funds that are economically successful 
can pay out surpluses to their insured. Due to the unification of contribution rates, competition 
among sickness funds is likely to focus on the magnitude of the additional premium or pay out 
or on the quality and extent of health care provision.    
 
However, two restrictions do limit the competitive role of the additional premium or pay out: 
First the additional premium cannot exceed one % of a household’s income.
20 Second, the 
Health Fund has to cover at least 95% of all expenses of the SHI system (at the beginning, the 
Fund’s revenues will have to cover all of the SHI expenditures). Figure 3 summarizes the basic 





                                                 
18 In 2004, health expenditures for children were estimated at € 13.4 billion in the SHI and at € 1.5 billion in the 
private health insurance system (German Federal Social Insurance Authority). 
19 In 2005, the risk structure equalisation system resulted in a financial transfer of € 16.35 billion (German Federal 
Social Insurance Authority). 
20 Up to an additional premium of € 8 a month, the one %-clause does not apply. An additional pay out will also 
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Source: Own graph. 
 
Greater choice of tariffs in the SHI system 
Other than the introduction of the Health Fund, sickness funds will have more freedom to offer 
different tariffs to their insured. According to the revised § 53 of the Social Security Code V, 
sickness funds have new options in four areas:    
 
1.  Franchises 
The possibility of signing up for a franchise, i.e. a maximum amount that the insured 
has to pay out-of-pocket per year in exchange for a higher pay out will be opened to 
compulsory insured as well. 
2.  Refund of contributions 
In contrast to the previous regulation, the option of contribution refunds, limited to a 
monthly contribution, will be extended to compulsory SHI insured.   
3.  New forms of medical provision 
Higher pay-outs can be tied to the condition that the insured joins one of the new forms 
of health service delivery such as integrated care, GP-centered schemes (gatekeeper 
model), disease management programs, or projects with selective contracting with 
certain health care providers. 
4.  Cost reimbursement principle 
The principle of benefits-in-kind can be more easily replaced by the cost reimbursement 
principle than previously. Also, the rate of cost reimbursement can be varied in 
exchange for a higher additional premium (e.g. an SHI insured individual can choose to 
reimburse his health care provider as if privately insured: paying a higher fee-for-
service rate). 
  
Currently, a large number of statutory sickness funds are developing new tariffs in these areas. 
Combinations of the new tariffs are also possible. However, the new tariffs require the insured 
to sign up for at least three years
21, the tariffs have to be self-supporting and are not allowed to 
be cross-subsidized by other tariffs. 
 
 
21 Except for tariffs with new forms of medical provision where insured only have to commit for one year. 
252 Statutory Health Insurances (SHI) (January 2007) 
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related)
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Additional Premium or Pay 
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sickness fund   
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adjusted payment)   17  
From an economic point of view, the new tariffs will enable sickness funds to focus more on 
preferences of their insured thus raising efficiency. On the other hand, the effects of 
redistribution will be reduced, e.g. if young people with higher income choose contracts with 
higher franchises, there will be less cross-subsidization for the elderly or low income 
individuals than today. Also, choice carries a risk of more intransparency – it will be more 
difficult to compare the various insurance tariffs. Moreover, the sickness funds will have to 
start building actuarial departments in order to calculate pay-outs or additional premiums. 
 
Centralization and mergers of sickness funds 
Other than financing previsions, the 2007 reform also affects the organizational structures of 
sickness funds. The creation of a federal head association of sickness funds (“Spitzenverband 
Bund”) from July 1
st 2008 probably constitutes the most far-reaching structural change. The 
new institution is to replace the existing seven head associations, each of which traditionally 
used to represent a different type of statutory sickness funds.  
 
Furthermore, the recent reform facilitates mergers of sickness funds belonging to different SHI 
types (e.g. a regional fund could merge with a company-based fund). Interstate mergers 
(mergers of funds located in different federal states) do not require an agreement of the state 
governments involved anymore.  
 
Private health insurers 
Private health insurers fear that the higher barrier to access for full contracts might result in a 
decreasing number of new contracts. Generally, the introduction of the basic tariff will move 
private insurances closer to the SHI system. Hence, the GKV-WSG might constitute a first step 
towards a uniform health insurance market. The new basic tariff will not be calculated 
according to actuarial risks but can only differ according to sex and age. In combination with 
the introduction of a maximum premium, PHI companies foresee a marked increase of regular 
risk-rated premiums, claiming that the latter is needed to cross-subsidize the basic tariff. They 
also fear that the obligation to offer the basic tariff without risk assessment might increase the 
risk of cream-skimming resulting in inefficiencies. Finally, competition among private health 
insurers and choice for privately insured could have been improved even more if the portability 
clause allowing individuals to change insurer and carry along accrued reserves for old age 
would not have been limited to the amount determined by the basic tariff (German Council of 
Economic Experts 2006). 
 
4.4.  The perspective of health care providers (initiatives for better coordination of 
care) 
The German Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System 
has repeatedly shown that the German system suffers from over-, under- and misuse of health 
care services. Amongst other things, inefficiencies are attributed to the lack of coordination 
between health care sectors and providers (Advisory Council on the Assessment of 
Developments in the Health Care System 2005). The idea of managed care has therefore gained 
momentum in German discussions on health care reform over the past years. Managed care and 
stronger patient guidance are believed to improve quality of care and to control costs by 
increasing coordination and the efficient use of health care resources. Since 2004, the number 
of GP-centered schemes, Diseases Management Programs, medical care centers and integrated 
care projects has steadily increased.  
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GP-centered care 
Since 2004 sickness funds are required offer their insured GP-centered schemes on a voluntary 
basis. The purpose is to increase quality and efficiency of care by giving the GP a stronger 
coordinating and guiding role. In February 2006, of 23 million sickness fund members, 2.6 
million actually participated in GP schemes (Böcken 2006).  
 
Data from the Bertelsmann Stiftung Healthcare Monitor shows that GP scheme enrollees are 
usually older and suffer more often from chronic diseases than non-participants. The number of 
specialist visits without referral is lower in the group of GP scheme participants than in the 
group of non-participants indicating that GPs have in fact assumed a stronger guiding and 
coordinating role (Böcken 2006).  
 
The great majority of GP scheme insurees are satisfied with the coordinating role of their 
family doctor: 92% think that referrals were made at the right time and the GP explained the 
referral in an understandable way (Böcken 2006). Regarding the willingness to participate in 
GP models, for most (potential) participants it is important that they can stay with their GP. 
Moreover, participants want to freely choose a specialist if access to specialists is tied to a 
referral from their GP. If the choice of specialists (or in that line also of hospitals and 
pharmacies) is left to the GP, willingness to participate decreases drastically. Financial 
advantages are also a major incentive for insurees to enrol in GP models (ibid).  
 
Disease Management Programs 
The first Disease Management Programs were introduced in Germany in 2003. Physicians and 
patients can enrol in these programs on a voluntary basis. Sickness funds currently offer DMPs 
for six chronic conditions: Diabetes Type 1 and Type 2, CHD, breast cancer, asthma, and 
COPD. In October 2006, about 2.6 million individuals participated in DMPs (van Lente and 
Willenborg 2006).
22 The Federal Insurance Office has issued the framework terms and 
approves of each single DMP. Plans to systematically evaluate experiences have not been 
carried out yet. Some DMPs have been self-evaluated by the sickness funds that run them, and 
results from patient and physician surveys indicate that satisfaction with quality and 
coordination of care has considerably increased. Individuals that participate in DMPs for 
diabetes showed for example improved blood sugar levels and blood pressure values (van 
Lente and Willenborg 2006).  
 
Integrated care and medical care centers 
The  Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act of 2004 paved the way for better 
coordination and continuity of care. The GMG introduced the possibility to establish medical 
care centers (policlinics) and the right for sickness funds and providers to enter into integrated 
care contracts. Integrated care is financed by redirecting 1% of the total budget available for 
ambulatory care and 1% of hospital budgets to integrated care contracts. Initially, this 
financing arrangement, so-called start-up financing, was to end in 2006. The 2007 SHI 
Competition Strengthening Act takes integrated care contracts further in that it extends start-up 
financing until the end of 2008 and encourages intersectoral cooperations with non-medical 
providers (such as speech therapists, occupational therapists, etc.) and long-term care 





22 There is a strong economic incentive for sickness funds to increase participation in DMPs since the number of 
registered chronically ill in DMPs is taken into consideration within the risk equalisation scheme (see section 4.3).   19  
Table 7 - Integrated Care in Germany. 
Quarter  Number of 
Contracts 
Insurees (m.)  Volume (m. €)
1. Quarter 2005  613  2.07  237,38 
2. Quarter 2005  841  2.18  278,18 
3. Quarter 2005  1.346  2.51  347,44 
4. Quarter 2005  1.913  3.16  446,20 
1. Quarter 2006  2.109  3.26  478,36 
2. Quarter 2006  2.469  3.38  498,78 
3. Quarter 2006  2.901  3.54  521,64 
4. Quarter 2006  3.309  3.59  570,71 
Source: German National Agency for Performance Measurement in Health Care (BQS). 
  
As Table 7 shows, the number of integrated care contracts has been rising significantly over the 
past two years, from 613 at the beginning of 2005 to more than 3300 contracts at the end of 
2006. Most integrated care contracts are regional and cover only specific diseases or 
indications (e.g. artificial hips, knee prosthesis). 
  
Medical care centers or policlinics have been a common form of care in the former German 
Democratic Republic. After German reunion most of the policlinics had been dissolved and 
outpatient care in the Eastern states had been organized as in the Western German states with 
practitioners working in solo practices and some in group practices. Today, only about 30 
former policlinics still exist and operate as medical care centers (Preusker 2007). However, the 
GMG led to a renaissance of medical care centers also in West Germany.  In September 2006, 
562 medical care centers existed in Germany compared to 270 in September 2005. On average, 
four physicians work together and most of these centers are managed by physicians or 
hospitals (ibid).   
 
All in all, the Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act 2004 and the recent Statutory 
Health Insurance Competition Strengthening Act set out the legal and organization framework 
for better coordination and cooperation in health care. As the increasing number of DMPs, 
integrated care projects, and medical centers show, providers and payers slowly accept these 
new forms of care. The majority of patients enrolled in such programs are satisfied with the 
quality of care provided. However, one central factor for further successful implementation of 
new forms of care will be convincing patients that more guidance and less choice will not work 
to their disadvantage. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In general, Germans enjoy very good access to and choice of health care. Access will be further 
improved by extending coverage to the entire population under the 2007 SHI Competition 
Strengthening Act. Private health insurance will be more affordable for lower income 
individuals by requiring private insurers to offer a basic benefit package at lower premiums.  
 
In terms of availability of services, Germany ranks at the top with regard to the ratio of 
physicians, hospital beds, nurses etc. to the population. The SHI benefit basket ranks among 
the most comprehensive of all European countries. The needs of an aging population and of 
individuals with long-term care conditions will be better met by transforming rehabilitative and 
palliative services into SHI reimbursable benefits from April 2007 on.    20  
                                                
 
The subsequent increase and implementation of new co-payments deliberately established 
barriers to access in Germany. The share of private expenditures on health care has risen over 
the last years, possibly complicating access to health care for certain socio-economic groups. 
Empirical studies on the impact of the 10€ practice fee on utilization and access show mixed 
results and further studies will be necessary to shed light on its effects.  
 
From the perspective of sickness funds, the facilitation of mergers and the introduction of the 
Health Fund will increase competition among SHI carriers via the additional premium. 
However, competition is limited given the ceiling for the premium. A greater variety of tariffs 
yields more choice to sickness funds. The centralization of sickness funds in a new federal 
organization indicates a development towards a more uniform health care system with more 
state influence and less corporatistic interventions from health care bodies and interest groups. 
Private health insurances partially converge towards the SHI system because of the new basic 
tariff. The portability of old-age provisions will not substantially increase competition since it 
will be limited to the basic tariff.   
 
New forms of care such as GP schemes, DMPs, and integrated care models that reduce patient 
choice and increase patient guidance slowly find their way into the German health care system. 
With the extension of start-up financing until the end of 2008 and the ease of administrative 
requirements to establish and run integrated care programs the government further promotes 
better coordinated systems of health care. However, preliminary studies indicate that patients 
do not yet fully embrace these new forms of care. Many fear that their choice of providers will 
be too strongly restricted. For new forms of care to be successfully implemented in Germany, 
conditions under which insurees are willing to participate in such programs need to be 
researched more in-depth
23.  Whereas new forms of care may result in less choice for patients, 
they enable payers to contract selectively and to become players responsible for quality and 
efficiency of services (from payer to player).  
 
23 Becker and Zweifel 2006   21  
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 7.  Appendix: German health care reforms from 1988 to today and their impact on access and choice 
 
Impact on access and choice from the perspective of…   Reform (Year passed) 
…the insured  …patients  …insurers  …providers 
Health Care Reform Act 
(1988) 
- Benefit basket extended to 
include new benefits for 
home-based nursing care, 
health promotion, and 
preventive services 
- Introduction of right for 
blue-collar workers whose 
income surpasses the income 
limit to opt out of SHI (so far 
only possible for white-collar 
workers) 
 
- Increase in co-payments for 
pharmaceuticals that fall 
within the reference price 
system, for transportation 
costs, and treatments at health 
resorts 
- Restructuring of co-
payments for dentures: 
amount to be paid out-of-
pocket depends upon on how 
regularly a person visits 
dentist for dental 
examinations 
- introduction of no-claim 
bonus model 
- Sickness funds are allowed 
to selectively contract with 
hospitals 
Health Care Structure Act 
(1992) 
- From 1996 on, most 
insurees are allowed to freely 
choose their sickness fund 
- Increase of co-payments for 
reference-priced 
pharmaceuticals (co-
payments are differentiated 
by price or package volume) 
- Introduction of competition 
between sickness funds  
- Abolition of strict separation 
between outpatient and 
hospital sector: Ambulatory 




Exoneration Act (1996), 
First and Second Statutory 
Health Insurance 
Restructuring Acts (1997) 
- Exclusion of dental 
treatment and dentures from 
the benefit basket for 
individuals born after 1978 
(abolished in 1998) 
- Rehabilitative care and 
health promotion services 
again excluded from the 
benefit basket 
- Increase of co-payments for 
pharmaceuticals and 
rehabilitative care (partly 
lowered again in 1999 and 
2000) as well as for inpatient 
care, medical aids, ambulance 
transportation and dentures 
- Sickness funds can offer no-
claim bonus models, 
deductible health plans 
- Increased possibilities for 
sickness funds to selectively 
contract with health care 
providers 
Act to Strengthen Solidarity 
in Statutory Health 
Insurance (1998) 
  - Lowering of co-payment 
rates for pharmaceuticals and 
dentures 
- Option for sickness funds to 
offer above mentioned tariffs 
to insurees revoked 
   2 
Statutory Health Insurance 
Reform Act (1999) 
- Exclusion of ineffective or 
disputed technologies and 
pharmaceuticals from the 
benefit basket; strengthening 
of Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA carried out 
by German Institute of 
Medical Documentation and 
Information) 
- Increase of income limit 
determining mandatory 
membership in the SHI 
  - Introduction of voluntary 
GP-centered care tariffs 
(sickness funds can offer their 
insured a bonus if they first 
see their GP) 
- Promotion of cooperation 
between providers from 
different health care sectors 
(groups of providers can 
contract with sickness funds 
to offer both outpatient and 
inpatient care) 
Statutory Health Insurance 
Modernization Act (GMG, 
2003) 
- Reduction of benefit basket: 
exclusion of drugs for petty 
diseases 
- Dentures are kept in benefit 
basket but insurees have to 
pay a special contribution of 
0.4% (not shared by 
employers) 
- Sick pay remains in benefit 
basket but insurees have to 
pay a special contribution of 
0.5% (not shared by 
employers) 
- 10€ user fee for out-patient 
services 
- Increased co-payments for 
pharmaceuticals, aids, 
transport costs, rehabilitation 
services, etc. 10 % or at least 
5 Euros and maximally 10 
Euros per good or service 
- Introduction of new 
exemption rules: patients 
have to pay maximally 1%, 
chronically ill 2% of their 
gross income privately 
 
- Sickness funds are required 
to offer their insured 
voluntary GP-centered care 
tariffs 
- Promotion of coordination 
of care and patient guidance: 
Introduction of medical care 
centers 
- Introduction of financial 
incentives to promote 
integrated care (start-up 
financing: 1% of funds 
available for outpatient and 
inpatient care are redirected 
to integrated care from 2004-
2006) 
- Lowering of organisational 
barriers to integrated care: 
Regional Associations of SHI 
Physicians do no longer have 
to be contract partners in 
integrated care projects 
 
Statutory Health Insurance 
Competition Strengthening 
Act (GKV-WSG, 2007) 
- Remaining closed sickness 
funds will be opened for all 
insurees (exception: farmer 
sickness funds and some 
company-based sickness 
  - Introduction of portability 
provision in private health 
insurance: insurees can carry 
along reserves for old age 
when changing insurers (not 
- Extension of start-up 
financing for integrated care 
until the end of 2008 
- Inclusion of rehabilitative 
care and non-medical health   3 
funds) 
- Higher barriers for opting 
out of SHI: income limit has 
to be exceeded three years in 
a row before individuals can 
opt out of SHI (until now, 
income threshold had to be 
exceeded only once) 
- Improved access to private 
health insurance for low-
income earners: Private 
insurers have to offer a basic 
tariff at a lower premium (not 
to exceed highest contribution 
rate of SHI, i.e. ~ €260) 
- Introduction of mandatory 
universal coverage 
- Extension of benefit basket: 
Inclusion of rehabilitative and 
palliative care, vaccinations 
recommended by the federal 
institute responsible for 
disease control and 
prevention, and inclusion of 
treatment at rehabilitative 
resorts for families with 
children 
- Care necessary due to 
complications after plastic 
surgery or piercings excluded 
from benefit basket 
possible so far) 
- Promotion of new tariffs 
such as GP-centered care 
tariffs, deductible health 
plans, integrated care plans, 
etc. 
professions (e.g. occupational 
therapists, speech therapists, 
etc.) into integrated care 
projects 
Source: Busse and Riesberg 2004; Federal Ministry of Health 2007 
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